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INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY: CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO THE COLLECTION AND
DISSEMINATION OF PERSONAL INFOR-
MATION BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
By Lawrence J. Leigh*
When may a person constitutionally challenge the collection of
sensitive personal information by government agencies? Under what
circumstances does a person have the right to the removal of personal
information from official files or the right to require restricted dissemi-
nation of personal information? These questions which lie at the heart
of an emerging right to informational privacy grow in importance as
Americans become increasingly uneasy about the nature ana extent of
data collected about them by the government.1
The average person is likely to be the subject of dozens of separate
files compiled by hospitals, educational institutions, criminal justice
agencies and tax and financial departments at the federal, state and local
level. Among the sensitive data that may be contained in such records
are labels such as addicted, arrested, convicted, truant, mentally retard-
ed, delinquent, homosexual and subversive.2
Whatever the purposes of governmental recordkeeping, it is usually
not too difficult for those gathering information to advance some justifi-
* Member, third year class.
1. See generally A. WEsTIN & M. BAxER, DATABANKS IN A FREE Socm-r 465-85
(1972). Public opinion surveys taken in the early seventies revealed that a substantial
minority of Americans perceived some invasion of personal privacy. [hereinafter cited
as WEsTIN I].
2. See generally A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971); A. NEER, Dos-
sim (1975); ON RECORD (S. Wheeler ed. 1969); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEaOM
(1967) [hereinafter cited as WESTIN I]. In the mid-sixties, federal files contained over
3 billion records on individual citizens including 264.5 million criminal histories, 279.6
million mental health records, 916.4 million profiles on alcoholism and drug addiction,
and over 1.2 billion financial records. Hearings on Federal Data Banks, Computers,
and the Bill of Rights Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 574 (1971). For a more recent
survey of the nature and scope of 858 federal data banks see STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, 93d CONG., 2d SESs.
1 FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS XXXIII-LVIH (Comm. Print
1974).
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cation for their activities. Whether the bureaucracy in question is a
police department, school, hospital or welfare bureau, the response is
likely to be the same-the more known about the people to be dealt
with, the greater the likelihood of making an informed decision.' But
there are several problems with such an answer. Recent studies in
information science indicate that too much information can actually
inhibit the process of decisionmaking.4 Information that is irrelevant or
only tangentially related to the decisionmaking process may do more
harm than good. The potential for misuse is increased by permitting
information to fall into the hands of persons either within or without a
collecting agency who are not sensitive to the dangers of misinterpreta-
tion of the collected data. Scholars and journalists are beginning to
supply solid evidence of cases of abuse. The educator whose evalua-
tions are prejudiced as a result of knowing a student's IQ test score5 or
the employer who refuses to hire on the basis of an applicant's raw arrest
record are not unfamiliar examples.
The possible adverse consequences to the individual from govern-
mental data collection do not necessarily stop at misuse by others. The
impact on an individual's thoughts and actions may by itself be detri-
mental. Once an individual knows that his activities or thoughts are the
subject of a file, his personal creativity and spontaneity may be inhibit-
ed.7  Data gathering activities which involve highly sensitive data may
3. Recent literature classifies records into three basic types: administrative, in-
vestigative and statistical. Administrative records contain information relating to a di-
rect transaction between a person and a government agency. Birth records, criminal his-
tories and license records are examples. Investigative records may contain information
drawn from administrative records, but usually include additional personal data not relat-
ing to governmental transactions. Common examples are personnel files, police intelli-
gence dossiers and probation reports. The primary purpose of investigative files is to
assist decisionmaking concerning file subjects. A third type of record, the statistical rec-
ord, is used to collect information about groups of subjects for planning and management
purposes. Census and other public survey files are the most obvious examples. See U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS
OF CrIZENS 5-6 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE].
At this writing, the uses and abuses of investigative records by federal intelligence agen-
cies are receiving widespread publicity. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON CIA AcTvI-iEs
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 130-50, 240-50 (1975). This
note, however, will not be addressed solely to privacy issues surrounding investigative
records, but will extend to administrative and statistical records as well.
4. Ackoff, Management Misinformation Systems, 14 MANAGEMENT ScL B-147
(1967); Altman, luvenile Information Systems: A Comparative Analysis, 24 JUVENILE
JUSTICE 2 (Feb. 1974); Bartlett & Green, Clinical Prediction: Does One Sometimes
Know Too Much?, 13 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY 267 (1966).
5. See, e.g., Mercer, IQ: The Lethal Label, 6 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 44 (Sept.
1972).
6. See, e.g., H. MILLER, THE CLOSED DOOR: THE EFFECT OF A CRIMINAL REcORD
EMPLOYMENT WITH STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC AGENCIES (1969).
7. Askin, Surveillance: The Social Science Perspective, 4 COLUM. HUMAN
[Vol. 3
engender thoughts or feelings which the subject not only wishes to
withhold from others, but that he also is trying to keep from his own
consciousness. Personality testing is a specific example of this type of
information collection.8 The anxiety created by knowledge that the
state possesses information which, if disclosed, will expose a person to
public shame or ridicule cannot be lightly dismissed. 9
Recent federal'0 and state" legislation has granted individuals
access to a wide variety of records concerning them, including educa-
tional, medical, financial and employment files. As individuals become
aware of their right to review the contents of such files, litigation
concerning the retention or dissemination of personal data will undoubt-
edly increase. The purpose of this note is to present a constitutional
theory of informational privacy to assist those lawyers and judges who
will be faced with such litigation.
I. A Right to Informational Privacy
A. The Supreme Court and the Right to Privacy
Federal Circuit Judge Shirley M. Hufstedler has accurately noted
that "[n]o corner of the privacy field is more unkempt than that tended
by the United States Supreme Court."'" Certainly the concept of
privacy has been applied in the protection of a variety of interests. But
the protection has also been uneven. Consider, for example, the Fourth
Amendment which states in part: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated . . ."3 There is little
doubt that the amendment provides considerable protection against
indiscriminate rummaging by police through the dwelling places and
personal effects of private persons."' Indeed, by holding that a viola-
tion of the amendment may occur whenever there is an invasion of a
RIGHTS L. REV. 59 (1972),; Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in PRI-
VACY 1 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1971).
8. Sherrer & Roston, Some Legal and Psychological Concerns about Personality
Testing in the Public Schools, 30 FED. B.J. 111 (1971).
9. WESTIN II, supra note 2, at 33-34.
10. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970); Privacy Act of 1974, 5
U.S.C.A. § 552a (Supp. 1, 1976); 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g (Supp. I, 1976); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 3771 (1973).
11. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 749B.5 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
15.165 (Supp. 1975); LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, COMPENDIUM
OF STATE LAWS GOVERNING THE PRIVACY AND SECUITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMA-
TION (1975).
12. S. HUFSTEDLER, THE DIRECTIONS AND MISDIRECTIONS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT oF PRIVACY 11 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HUFSTEDLER].
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
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justifiable or reasonable expectation of privacy 5 the Supreme Court
has extended protection far beyond traditional cases of illegal trespass
by police.16
But the words "searches and seizures" in the Fourth Amendment
are, nonetheless, terms of limitation. 17 Governmental information gath-
ering practices which do not involve either a search or seizure are not
proscribed by the amendment.' 8  This leaves governmental officials
considerable freedom to collect information. For example, neither the
mere receipt of information from a person who is not an agent of the
state,'9 nor the observation of the physical characteristics of an individ-
ual in a public place2° are considered searches or seizures under the
amendment. As a general rule, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection."'" Consequently, an Internal Revenue sum-
mons to an accountant to produce his client's business records does not
infringe upon the guarantee of the client's reasonable expectation of
privacy.22 The Fourth Amendment, moreover, is governed by a rule of
reasonableness; it proscribes only unreasonable searches and seizures.25
It is not unreasonable, for example, for a congressional statute to require
that all foreign currency transactions over $5,000 be reported to the
Treasury Department. 24  Finally, Fourth Amendment rights are person-
al rights which may not be vicariously asserted. A party whose rights
are not violated apparently has no standing to contest an illegal search
or seizure no matter how detrimental the information collected is to
him.25
15. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
16. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MrNN. L. REV.
349, 356-409 (1974).
17. Id. at 356.
18. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973). In Dionisio the Court held
that neither a subpoena to appear before a grand jury nor an order to produce a voice
exemplar were seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, they did not have to
meet the amendment's test of reasonableness. Id. at 8-15. But see Nixon v. Sampson,
389 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1975), entry of order stayed sub norm. Nixon v. Richey, 513
F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see note 109 infra.
19. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-90 (1971).
20. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 309-10, 313 (1959).
21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
22. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973).
23. In many situations search and seizures will be reasonable only if they are pur-
suant to a valid search warrant. United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297
(1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
24. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59-63 (1974).
25. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973). In Brown the Supreme
Court held that where the defendants were not on the premises at the time of the police
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These illustrations are not intended to present a definitive outline
of the Fourth Amendment but only to demonstrate that its restraints are
limited. Whatever it may become in the future,2 6 at present Fourth
Amendment law does not encompass a general constitutional right to
privacy. 7  Not only does it provide limited protection against the overly
broad collection of personal information, but it provides practically no
limitation on what officials may do with information they gather by
lawful means.
The focus of the Fifth Amendment is narrower still. The privilege
against self-incrimination provided by the Fifth Amendment protects
only against disclosure of information which would tend to expose a
person to a criminal penalty. 28 Its prohibitions do not extend to disclo-
sure of facts which expose an individual to loss of reputation or standing
in the community.29 In addition, the privilege is purely personal and
does not apply to information obtained from third parties. 30 As stated
by Justice Holmes: "[a] party is privileged from producing . . . evi-
dence, but not from its production."'" The Fifth Amendment provides
no protection where a person is required by statute to submit informa-
tion unless the disclosure would create a substantial hazard of self-
incrimination and the statute singles out a select group inherently sus-
pect of criminal activities. 2
Like the Fifth Amendment, the First Amendment contains signifi-
cant restrictions on governmental efforts to obtain information, but there
are limits to its protection as well. The Supreme Court has adopted the
strict scrutiny test in cases involving the governmental collection and
search nor had any proprietary interest in the premises, they did not have standing to
challenge the propriety of the search.
26. Judge Hufstedler has suggested an increased emphasis on the Fourth Amend-
ment's guarantee of security of person so that "any governmental probe, corporeal or
incorporeal, designed to uncover or to disclose information about a person would be a
'search."' HUFSTEDLER, supra note 12, at 26. See also text accompanying note 109
infra.
27. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
28. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972).
29. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 605-06 (1896).
30. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).
31. Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
32. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427-31 (1971). In Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1, 32-36 (1948), the Supreme Court held that the mandatory preservation of
business records for governmental examination to facilitate price regulation did not vio-
late the Fifth Amendment. The Court restricted the scope of Shapiro in Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), holding that failure to supply certain wagering infor-
mation in connection with a federal gambling tax was justified under the Fifth Amend-
ment. The Court noted that the information required was not customarily kept, that
the records had no public record aspects, and that the requirements were directed at a
"'selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.'" Id. at 57. See also Grosso
v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968).
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disclosure of information about the associations of private individuals.
Absent a compelling state interest, the government cannot compel an
organization to disclose its membership lists33 or an individual to
disclose the organizations3 4 to which he belongs. However, these deci-
sions are based on factual situations where the government has required
the subject himself to supply the information, and recognize only a right
of privacy in one's associations. They do not necessarily bring the
collection and disclosure of other types of information obtained from
third parties within the ambit of First Amendment protection.35
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the Fourth, Fifth and First
Amendments guarantee certain individual rights which may not be
infringed by the collection and use of information by the government.
But the limited scope of these protections raises several unsettling ques-
tions. If official practices relating to the gathering and use of personal
information do not invade the First, Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights
of the subject of the information, may the government collect, store or
transmit such information without restriction?
Specifically, may it require an individual to disclose nonassocia-
tional, nonincriminating personal information no matter how sensitive?
May it engage in unrestricted collection of personal information
from sources other than the subject of the information?
May it maintain and store personal information without taking any
special precautions to preserve its confidentiality?
May it engage in the unrestricted dissemination of personal infor-
mation?
A partial answer to these questions is found in the guarantees of
procedural due process of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In
Wisconsin v. Constantineau,36 the Supreme Court held that local offi-
cials could not post notices that sales and gifts of liquor to certain
persons were forbidden unless these individuals were given adequate
notice and hearing. The Court indicated that whenever stigmatizing
personal information is publicly disclosed, notice and an opportunity to
33. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Lou-
isiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293.(1961); Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
34. DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 (1966);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). Nor may the government absent a legitimate
state interest withhold a benefit, such as a license to practice law, for refusal to answer
questions about personal associations. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
Although the opinion of the Court in Baird did not use the phrase "compelling state inter-
est," it did indicate that the state had a "heavy burden" to show that the inquiry was
necessary. Id. at 6.
35. See cases cited notes 33, 34 supra.
36. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
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be heard may be essential.17 There will, however, be occasions where
personal information should neither be collected nor disseminated irres-
pective of the adequacy of procedural safeguards. In such situations
Constantineau is of no assistance to those seeking relief.
A partial answer to these questions is also found in the general
constitutional right of privacy first articulated in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut. 8 In that case, the Supreme Court struck down a state statute
forbidding the private use of contraceptives. In so doing, it held that a
constitutional zone of privacy exists in addition to the specific guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights.39 Expanding the doctrine in Roe v. Wade, 0
the Court declared that the decision to have an abortion, at least in the
early periods of pregnancy, is within the zone of protected privacy. It
stated that fundamental rights of privacy may not be abridged absent a
compelling state interest.41
Whether the right of privacy is located in the general language of
the Ninth Amendment or emanates as a penumbra from the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, or is inherent in the
concept of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, is a subject
of some dispute, as are the precise contours of the right itself.42 At
present, the right includes, but is not necessarily limited to, "the person-
al intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procrea-
tion, and child rearing. ' '4 3  In its privacy decisions the Court has
confined itself to the discussion of the right of individual autonomy, and
has not addressed the right of informational privacy. 44
37. Justice Douglas speaking for the Court stated that "[w]here a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing
to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Id. at 439. Cf. Doe
v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 323-24 (1973). At this writing, the Court has just granted
certiorari in another case involving allegedly stigmatizing information. Davis v. Paul,
505 F.2d 1180 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 909 (1975) (No. 891, 1974
Term). The plaintiff in Davis commenced a class action alleging a denial of civil rights
as a result of the distribution of a flyer entitled "Active Shoplifter" upon which his name
appeared. Relying on Wisconsin v. Constantineau, the court of appeals held that "law
enforcement officials cannot, consistent with the Due Process Clause, brand a person as
an active shoplifter when he has never been tried for the offense." Id. at 1184. The
outcome of Davis could be crucial to the survival of a right to informational privacy.
If unfettered dissemination of such damaging and potentially misleading information as
raw arrest records is permitted, it will be extremely difficult to sustain any constitutional
challenge to the collection and use of personal information.
38. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
39. Id. at 484-85.
40. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
41. Id. at 152-53.
42. Id. at 155-56. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (state law prohibiting
the viewing of obscene movies in public theatres does not infringe upon the right of pri-
vacy).
44. Id.; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973);
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Individual autonomy refers to the right to determine for oneself
whether one will go through or abstain from certain experiences, such as
contraception or abortion." On the other hand, informational privacy
is, as so well defined by Professor Alan F. Westin, "[the] claim of
individuals . . .to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others. '46 Informa-
tional privacy and individual autonomy, nevertheless, share similar char-
acteristics. Neither is explicitly found in the language of the Constitu-
tion, but both appear to be implicit in the specific guarantees found in
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Both would seem to
be part of the classic right to be let alone so eloquently described by Mr.
Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions fa-
vorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signif-
icance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.47
B. A Case-by-Case Approach
The initial definition of new constitutional concepts is often articu-
lated in forums other than the Supreme Court. Valuable discussion of
informational privacy is to be found in the decisions of lower federal and
state courts. Such decisions have involved challenges to the collection
of criminal justice, medical, educational, welfare and financial informa-
tion.
1. Criminal Justice Information
York v. Story,48 which predated Griswold, is an important circuit
court decision on informational privacy. The factual context of this
case presented constitutional violations arising not only from the dissem-
ination of information to third parties, but also from mere collection of
the information. York involved a female complainant who went to
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See
also Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L
REv. 670 (1973) [hereinafter cited as On Privacy].
45. See generally Beardsley, Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure in PRI-
VACy 56 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971); On Privacy, supra note 44.
46. WESTIN II, supra note 2, at 7.
47. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) cf. Warren & Bran-
deis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
48. 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
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police to report that she had been assaulted. A male officer insisted
that she pose for nude photographs although her bruises would not
appear in the photographs, and the photographs would not actually be
needed in the prosecution of the case. The officer subsequently distrib-
uted the photographs to other officers in the department even though the
photographs could not have aided in apprehending the offender.
The Ninth Circuit held that the appellant's allegations, if supported
by the evidence, demonstrated a violation of her constitutional right to
privacy inherent in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.49 According to the court, at least three separate aspects of the
police conduct were constitutionally objectionable: 1) the actual expo-
sure of the complainant's nude body to the male police officer; 2) the
taking and retention of the photographs; and 3) the dissemination of the
photographs to the other officers.50 At the very least, York stands for
the proposition that government officials acting under color of law may
not collect and disseminate personal information for private as opposed
to governmental purposes.
A subsequent Ninth Circuit decision restricted York to its facts.
In Baker v. Howard,51 police questioned an individual about a suspi-
cious incident but concluded that no crime had been committed. They
nevertheless released a police report suggesting that the suspect had
committed a crime. A radio station published the report and as a result
the suspect lost his teaching position. Distinguishing York, the court
held that "the invasion of privacy here complained of is not . . . so
flagrant that it calls for invocation of the Constitution."52 Not all courts
49. Id. at 456.
50. Id. at 455-56.
51. 419 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1969).
52. Id. at 377. Courts appear to be much more reluctant to find a right of privacy
where an individual has been suspected of involvement in crime or has been convicted.
In Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973) the
court reversed the trial court and dismissed a complaint filed by a person convicted of
murder who alleged that police officials disseminated libelous and slanderous informa-
tion about him before and after he was taken into custody. In Travers v. Paton, 261
F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1966), the district court held that the shooting and subsequent
televising of a film of a parol hearing of a state prison inmate did not violate the inmate's
constitutional right of privacy. The court distinguished York on the grounds that the in-
trusion was not "shocking." Id. at 115. See also Mimms v. Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc., 352 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Mattheis v. Hoyt, 136 F. Supp. 119 (W.D.
Mich. 1955). However, the constitutional right of privacy has been cited to deny de-
fense counsel the right to administer an anonymous questionnaire to grand jurors for
purposes of showing underrepresentation by age and social class. People v. Super. Ct.
(Dean), 38 Cal. App. 3d 966, 976, 113 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739-40 (1974); see also People
v. Norman, 76 Misc. 2d 644, 651, 350 N.Y.S.2d 52, 60 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (discovery of
police officers' personnel records for impeachment purposes absent a showing of more
than mere speculation by the defense is tantamount to an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy); cf. United States v. Liebert, 519 F.2d 542 (3rd Cir. 1975).
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have taken such a benign view of the information-gathering practices of
criminal justice agencies. Indeed, some courts have gone beyond York
to hold that the mere collection and retention of certain information
even without dissemination to private parties may be constitutionally
impermissible.5 3
In Davidson v. Dill 4 the plaintiff was arrested and tried for
loitering but was subsequently acquitted. She then brought an action
demanding the return of her arrest record. Reversing a lower court
dismissal of her complaint, the Supreme Court of Colorado concluded
that a court should expunge an arrest record or order its return when
the harm to the individual's right of privacy or dangers of unwarranted
adverse consequences o'utweigh the public interest in retaining the rec-
ords in police files. 55 The court noted that privacy is a fundamental
right, and indicated that police officials must demonstrate a compelling
state interest in maintaining arrest records. 56 Remanding the case for
adjudication on its merits, the court urged the lower court to consider:
"[w]ho has access to these records, what facts are contained in them,
how likely and to what extent information in the records may be dis-
seminated, and what justification exists for their retention in the police
files. .. .
In a recent California case, White v. Davis,58 the constitutionality
53. See, e.g., cases cited notes 54, 55, 58 infra.
54. 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972).
55. Id. at 130, 503 P.2d at 161. Accord, Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487
P.2d 211 (1971); United States v. Hudson, 103 Wash. Law Rep. 377 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1975). See also Doe v. Commander, Wheaton Police Dept., 273 Md. 262, 329 A.2d
35 (1974). But see Monroe v. Tielsch, 84 Wash. 2d 217, 525 P.2d 250 (1974). Con-
tra, United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 18 Cr. Law Rep.
4013 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1975); Herschel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 973 (1966); United States v. Seasholtz, 376 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Okla. 1974);
United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Coalition of Black Leader-
ship v. Doorley, 349 F. Supp. 127, 130 (D.R.I. 1972); Beasley v. Glenn, 110 Ariz. 438,
520 P.2d 310 (1974).
In Tosh v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 482 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1973), local police
officials furnished the criminal histories of union organizers to the management of a su-
permarket which had been the scene of incidents in which the organizers were involved.
The court held that the Constitution did not ban a state agency from furnishing such
information to the supermarket management since it had a legitimate need for the in-
formation. Id. at 332.
The general issue of expungement of arrest records and the various approaches to-
ward resolution of the problem is a vast subject beyond the scope of this note. See gen-
erally Note, Criminal Procedure: Expunging the Arrest Record When There Is No
Conviction, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 377 (1975); Comment, Retention and Dissemination of
Arrest Records: Judicial Response, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 850 (1971).
56. Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 130, 503 P.2d 157, 161 (1972).
57. Id. at 132-33, 503 P.2d at 162.
58. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
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of police intelligence activity at the University of California at Los
Angeles was challenged. Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction
against the Los Angeles .Police Department to prevent undercover offi-
cers from attending discussions in university classes and in public and
private meetings of university-sponsored organizations for the purpose
of compiling intelligence reports. A lower court sustained a demurrer
to the plaintiffs' complaint and entered judgment for the defendants.
Noting that the complaint alleged that the information gathered by the
police did not pertain to illegal activity, the California Supreme Court
ruled that the lower court erred in sustaining the demurrer.5" The court
held that absent a compelling state interest which was not revealed in the
pleadings, the stationing of undercover agents in classrooms and the
extensive collection of information about members of the university
community violated the First Amendment 0 and a state constitutional
right to privacy."' It also implied that the police practices violated the
federal right to privacy as well.62 White illustrates the potential overlap
in protection which the First Amendment and the right of privacy
provide when the information collected relates to beliefs or associa-
tions.33  As both York v. Story64 and Davidson v. Dill6 5 demonstrate,
that overlap is not present in every case, since much information collect-
ed and retained by criminal justice agencies has nothing directly to do
with the exercise of First Amendment rights.
2. Health and Medical Information
In Roe v. Ingraham,66 patients and physicians challenged a New
York statute which required physicians to file copies of prescriptions for
certain drugs with the state department of health. A federal district
court dismissed the complaint, which alleged that the statute violated the
plaintiff's constitutional right to privacy,6" for lack of a substantial
59. Id. at 760, 533 P.2d at 224, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
60. Id. at 772-73, 533 P.2d at 232, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
61. Id. at 776, 533 P.2d at 234-35, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106-07. See also CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 1.
62. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94,
106 (1975).
63. See also Comment, Police Surveillance of Political Dissidents, 4 COL. HuMAN
RIGHTs L. Rav. 101 (1972).
64. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
65. See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
66. 480 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1973).
67. Id. at 105. In Felber v. Foote, 321 F. Supp. 85 (D. Conn. 1970), a case aris-
ing prior to Roe v. Wade, the district court held that a psychiatrist had no right to de-
claratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of a state statute requiring him to report
the names and other personal information of drug dependent patients to the state depart-
ment of health. The court concluded that there was no general constitutional right of
privacy. Id. at 89. The California Supreme Court in In Re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415,
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federal question. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding
that the disclosure of the information mandated by the statute presented
a substantial constitutional question of invasion of privacy."8 The court
stated:
If there is anything "obvious" about the constitutional right to
privacy at the present time, it -is that its limits remain to be worked
out in future cases. Should the constitutionally protected zone of
privacy be extended beyond the area already recognized, the indi-
vidual's interest in keeping to himself the existence of his physical
ailments and his doctor's prescriptions for them would lie rather
close in the continuum. If New York had passed a statute direct-
ing that all prescriptions, or even all prescriptions for Schedule II
drugs, must be published in the press, we do not think the State
would have seriously contended, still less that the district judge
would have held, that a constitutional attack was "obviously friv-
olous."' 6 9
New York had argued that the central filing of the prescriptions was
necessary to detect negligent or intentional over-prescription of danger-
ous drugs by doctors. While acknowledging that the state had ad-
vanced a powerful argument for sustaining the statute, the court none-
theless urged consideration by a three-judge court of how the
confidentiality of the information was actually being preserved.
If it were clear that the State had taken or proposed to take ef-
fective steps, by regulation or otherwise, to limit access to the pa-
tients' names on the prescription forms as rigidly as is consistent
with accomplishment of the asserted statutory purpose, the grounds
for constitutional attack might disappear. But the district court
was not entitled to dismiss the complaint on the basis of the State's
assertions that it has already done this.7
The above language strongly suggests that a sharing of the infor-
mation with other governmental agencies for purposes not related to its
collection may be prohibited.
On remand, however, the relevancy of the information rather than
safeguards insuring its confidentiality became the critical issue. A
424, 467 P.2d 557, 562, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 834 (1970), held that a psychiatrist could
not constitutionally refuse to disclose his patient's treatment records in a personal injury
suit where the patient failed to challenge such disclosure. The court observed that the
psychiatrist's privacy interest apart from that of his patient was not significant. In As-
sociation of American Phys. & Sur. v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1975),
the district court held that a statute which required physicians to report information on
patients to nonprofit professional associations charged with the responsibility of oversee-
ing funds paid under medicare or medicaid did not violate the physician's right of pri-
vacy. A critical factor in the court's decision was the statutory provision that the confi-
dentiality of the information be maintained, and that persons seeking unauthorized ac-
cess to the information be subject to criminal sanctions. Id. at 135-37.
68. Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1973).
69. Id. at 108.
70. Id. at 109.
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three-judge federal district court declared that the doctor-patient rela-
tionship was within the constitutional zone of privacy, and held that the
state's regulatory scheme was unnecessarily broad.7' The court con-
cluded that the state could determine whether there was over-prescrip-
tion of dangerous drugs from reports by physicians without knowing the
name of the person receiving the drugs.72  Experience under the pre-
scription reporting program revealed that official knowledge of the
patient's name contributed nothing to the objectives of the statute.
Schulman v. New York City Health and Hospital Corp.73 presents
another case involving medical records. In Schulman, a gynecologist
and a patient who had obtained an abortion at a city hospital center
sought to invalidate a city requirement that a pregnancy termination
certificate be filed with a central filing registry maintained by the New
York City Board of Health. Local health department regulations
adopted pursuant to the New York City charter provided that the
abortion records would not be subject to subpoena or to inspection by
persons other than authorized personnel in the department.
The court noted that the plaintiff possessed a legitimate right of
privacy under Roe, but held that the assurance of the confidentiality of
such information coupled with the state's compelling interest in gather-
ing the information required a rejection of the plaintiffs claim.74  The
principal compelling state interests were 1) to allow followup where
medical complications ensue, 2) to enable public health authorities to
investigate if proper procedures were followed in an outpatient facility,
3) to provide statistical information as to the effect of multiple abortions
on the same woman, 4) to offer public health counseling on family
planning and 5) to insure that women who test positive for an Rh
negative factor, venereal disease or other factors receive proper counsel-
ing and treatment.75
In sum, there appears to be little doubt that where the state interest
is strong, the collection and retention by appropriate agencies of highly
71. Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
72. Id. at 938.
73. 44 App. Div. 2d 482, 355 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1974).
74. Id. at 486, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 785; accord, Planned Parenthood of Central Mo.
v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1374 (E.D. Mo. 1975). In State v. Jacobus, 75 Misc.
2d 840, 348 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. 1973), the state sought an order enjoining defendant
doctors from omitting from certificates of fetal death the name and addresses of parents
of aborted fetuses. Such information was used to compile state vital statistics. The
court noted that there were no safeguards to insure the confidentiality of the informa-
tion, which might be subject to subpoena by local district attorneys. For these reasons,
the doctors were justifed in their noncompliance with the reporting requirements until
the confidentiality of the information could be assured by legislation or other appropriate
means. Id. at 846, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 913-14.
75. Schulman v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 44 App. Div. 2d 482.
485, 355 N.Y.S.2d 781, 784-85 (1974).
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sensitive health and medical records will be permitted.' 0 Courts, never-
theless, appear receptive to constitutional arguments that states must
take adequate steps to preserve the confidentiality of such records."
3. Welfare and Educational Information
In Merriken v. Cressman,78 a mother and her son, a junior -high
school student, brought an action to restrain the implementation of a
school-sponsored drug prevention program. The essence of the pro-
gram consisted of the administration of questionnaires containing per-
sonal questions about parents and family. For example, students were
asked whether their parents gave them affection and whether they felt
loved by their parents. They were also asked to identify other students
who acted unusually, made odd remarks or quarrelled with other stu-
dents.7° The findings from the questionnaires were to be utilized at
some later time as guide for intervention by school personnel, many of
whom were not trained in psychotherapy or psychology. Such interven-
tion was to consist of a form of peer group therapy. The program did
not provide specific guidelines for the preservation of the confidentiality
of the information which would have been disseminated to various
personnel including school superintendents, principals, coaches, PTA
officers and school board members. 80 Holding that the program violat-
ed the plaintiffs right to privacy inherent in the penumbra of the Bill of
Rights, 8 ' the federal district court noted: "These questions go directly to
an individual's family relationship and his rearing. There is probably
no more private a relationship, excepting marriage, which the Constitu-
tion safeguards than that between parent and child. 82
In contrast to Merriken are decisions involving the constitutionality
of statutes which require unwed mothers who receive federal or state
assistance to disclose the name of the putative father.-" The purpose of
such disclosure is to enable the state to enforce the father's duty to
contribute to the welfare of the child. In such cases plaintiff mothers
have objected to disclosure primarily on the ground that it leads to
added strain within the home and sometimes results in the permanent
separation of the putative father from the rest of the family.8 4 Courts in
76. See cases cited note 74 supra.
77. Id.
78. 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
79. Id. at 916.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 922.
82. Id. at 918.
83. Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975); Burdick v. Miech, 385 F. Supp. 927
(E.D. Wis. 1974); Saiz v. Goodwin, 325 F. Supp. 23 (D.N.M. 1971).
84. See, e.g., Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated on other
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these cases have held that no fundamental right of privacy prohibits
disclosure.8 5 The question of preserving the confidentiality of such
information once it passes to welfare officials apparently has not been an
issue.
4. Financial and Other Miscellaneous Information
City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young8 6 involved the public disclo-
sure of personal financial information. Plaintiff, City of Carmel,
brought an action attacking the validity of a financial disclosure law
enacted for the purpose of exposing and minimizing possible conflicts of
interest among governmental officials. The California statute required
that every public officer and each candidate for state or local office file
as a public record a statement describing the nature and extent of his
investments, and a similar statement concerning investments in excess of
$10,000 owned by his spouse or minor children. The law did not limit
disclosure to those financial dealings or assets which could be expected
to give rise to a conflict of interest. It mandated disclosure without
regard to the nature or location of the assets, or the powers and duties of
the officer.8 7  The harmful effects of unnecessarily broad disclosure
were noted by the court:
[he newspaper publication of a public officer's assets, or those
of the spouse or children, can be expected to bring unwanted
solicitation from a variety of salesmen and others, could well en-
courage harassment lawsuits or demands of like nature, and could
expose the public officer and family to various criminal elements
in our society. Other public officials whose worth or investments
do not require disclosure may find that fact understandably embar-
rassing. The invasion of privacy rights and the chilling or dis-
couraging effect upon the seeking or holding of public office, great
or small, or high or low, appears too clear for dispute.8
The court declared that the statute violated the United States
Constitution.89 The overly broad compulsory disclosure intruded into
the zone of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment and that
"penumbra of constitutional rights into which the government may not
.grounds sub nom. Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975). The substantial infringement
on privacy inherent in the present welfare system is the subject of empirical inquiry in
Handler & Hollingsworth, Stigma, Privacy and Other Attitudes of Welfare Recipients,
22 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1969).
85. Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65, 77 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975); Burdick v. Miech, 385 F. Supp.
927, 930 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Saiz v. Goodwin, 325 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D.N.M. 1971).
Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
86. 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
87. Id. at 269-70, 466 P.2d at 232-33, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 8-9.
88. Id. at 270, 466 P.2d at 233, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
89. Id. at 272, 466 P.2d at 235, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
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intrude absent a showing of compelling need .... .,0 A more nar-
rowly drawn statute, however, providing for broad disclosure of assets
relevant to the duties of public officers and employees would satisfy the
constitutional requirement that the least restrictive means be employed
where fundamental liberties are concerned. 91
Four years after City of Carmel, the California Supreme Court
upheld a second conflict of interest statute written to meet the objections
voiced in the earlier decision.9 ' Among other things, the new statute
required certain designated officials to disclose only those interests
which would have a material effect on decisions by the officials acting
within the scope of their public duties.93
In other states conflict of interest statutes have been sustained on
the grounds that broad public disclosure is necessary to further the
state's interest in effective government.94 Courts sustaining such stat-
utes, however, have refrained from denying the possibility that instances
may exist where public dissemination of personal financial data might
infringe upon an individual's right of informational privacy. In Illinois,
for example, state employees challenged the constitutionality of a gover-
nor's order requiring them to file as a public record statements of
economic interest which included a complete accounting of assets and
liabilities. " The Illinois Supreme Court held that the sweeping disclo-
sure requirements did not infringe upon the right of privacy.96 Unlike
the California Supreme Court in the City of Carmel, the Illinois court
concluded that the required disclosure was necessary to further a com-
pelling state interest.97 The court, however, did not expressly reject the
concept of a right of informational privacy relating to financial data.
In addition to challenges to financial disclosure laws,98 challenges
90. Id. at 268, 466 P.2d at 232, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
91. Id. at 272, 466 P.2d at 234, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
92. County of Nevada v. MacMillen, 11 Cal. 3d 662, 522 P.2d 1345, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (1974).
93., Id. at 668-69, 522 P.2d at 1348-459, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
94. Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 Ill. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9 (1974).
Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill. 2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 925
(1973); Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 336 A.2d 97 (1975); Fritz v. Gor-
ton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 902 (1974).
95. Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 Ill. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9 (1974).
96. Id. at 526, 315 N.E.2d at 16-17.
97. Id.
98. Reference to the privacy issues associated with the collection of financial infor-
mation was made in a recent United States Supreme Court Case. California Bankers
Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring). In Califor-
nia Bankers the Court, in a six-to-three decision, ruled that federal statutes and imple-
menting regulations requiring financial institutions to report domestic currency transac-
tions over $10,000, and individuals to report foreign currency transactions over $5,000,
did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of those reporting the information. A con-
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to collection and dissemination of various types of administrative data
have been made within the last decade. Courts have been unsympathet-
ic to attacks on laws mandating the fingerprinting of stockbrokers, aa
mental patients, 10 0 realtors' 01 and gun dealers and transporters. 02 Simi-
larly, regulations requiring that social security numbers be submitted as
a condition of obtaining a license to drive'0 3 and to practice law'04 have
been upheld. As to the question of improper dissemination, at least two
courts have held that the sale of motor vehicle registration records to
private parties does not violate the right of privacy. 05
C. Emerging Principles
As the foregoing discussion has illustrated, informational privacy
questions cut across a wide variety of governmental agencies, records
and data collection practices. Moreover courts are in disagreement as
to when the right of informational privacy even exists. The danger of
mixing apples with oranges while formulating constitutional standards
in this area should not be taken lightly. Some courts have tended to
equate the right of individual autonomy protected in Griswold and Roe
with the right of informational privacy, 10 6 but the interests underlying
the two rights are, of course, different. 0 7 When courts do equate the
curring opinion by Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, however, cautioned that
an extension of the regulations would raise "difficult constitutional questions." Id. at
78. In their view, "[ait some point, governmental intrusion upon these areas would im-
plicate legitimate expectations of privacy." Id. at 79. Whether Justice Powell was re-
ferring to the type of privacy protected by the First or Fourth Amendment or to the
general constitutional right of privacy is not clear. The ambiguity in the opinion, how-
ever, leaves the impression that any or all of the above constitutional guarantees might
apply depending on the circumstances of the case.
99. Thom v. New York Stock Exchange, 306 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd
sub nom. Miller v. New York Stock Exchange, 425 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 905 (1970).
100. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971).
101. Hamilton v. New Jersey Real Estate Comm'n Dep't of Ins., 117 N.J. Super.
345, 284 A.2d 564 (1971).
102. Burton v. Sills, 99 N.J. Super. 516, 240 A.2d 462 (1967).
103. Conant v. Hill, 326 F. Supp. 25, 26 (E.D. Va. 1971) (citing a previous unpub-
lished decision Conant v. Hill, Civil No. 609-70-R (E.D. Va. Mar. 17, 1971).
104. Cantor v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 353 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
105. Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (claim that dissemination violated right of privacy found insubstantial where in-
formation was neither vital nor intimate but rather in the category of public record);
Chapin v. Tynan, 158 Conn. 625, 264 A.2d 566 (1969) (per curiam opinion not discuss-
ing reasons for sustaining lower court's dismissal of an action for an injunction restrain-
ing the commissioner of motor vehicles from selling licensing information).
106. See, e.g., Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 917-18 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 131, 503 P.2d 157, 161 (1972).
107. See text accompanying notes 38-46 supra.
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right of informational privacy with the right of individual autonomy,
they commit serious error. Individual autonomy is likely to be restrict-
ed to a narrow range of situations dealing with home, family and
procreation.108 Confusion of the two rights may result in decisions
similarly restricting the right of informational privacy. This would be
unfortunate, since the collection of highly personal information unrelat-
ed to home, family and procreation may, nevertheless, involve risk of
substantial harm to the individual.
As with the right of individual autonomy, the locus of the right of
informational privacy is far from clear. The right would seem to lie
somewhere between "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
and the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. Perhaps its ultimate resting
place will be an expansion of the guarantees of the Fourth Amend-
ment.10 9 Identifying the precise origins of the right, however, may be
108. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973).
109. See Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1975), entry of order stayed
sub nom. Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1975); HUFSTEDLER, supra note
12, at 26. The unique controversy in Sampson involved the ownership of and access to
former President Richard M. Nixon's tapes and papers. Mr. Nixon sought an order from
the federal district court requiring the federal government to comply with the terms of an
agreement concluded shortly after Mr. Nixon left office between Mr. Nixon and Arthur
F. Sampson, Administrator of the General Services Administration. The agreement pro-
vided for transfer to Mr. Nixon of various tapes and papers of his administration left be-
hind in the course of Mr. Nixon's extraordinary departure from the White House. The
special prosecutor, an intervenor-defendant, counterclaimed against Mr. Nixon for de-
claratory relief asserting the right to access to the president's tapes and papers pursuant
to an agreement concluded between the special prosecutor and President Ford on Novem-
ber 9, 1974. Mr. Nixon contended that the November 9th agreement providing the special
prosecutor with access violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The court, however, held that the tapes and papers were govern-
ment property in the government's possession, and .therefore, any examination by the spe-
cial prosecutor pursuant to the November 9th agreement did not violate Mr. Nixon's right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 154-55. The court, neverthe-
less, held that Mr. Nixon had a right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment with re-
spect to his personal papers and conversations which were intermingled with official
tapes and papers. Id. at 156-57. In accordance with its holding, the court announced vari-
ous procedures for the segregation of Mr. Nixon's personal materials from his official pa-
pers and tapes and the restriction of government access to the latter. The details of those
procedures are of no particular concern to this discussion, but the court's views on the
Fourth Amendment are. Its holding is a departure from the theory that there is no
Fourth Amendment protection of privacy where there is no unlawful search and seizure.
See text accompanying notes 17-27 supra. The court's decision implies an independent
right of information privacy existing within the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.
In the midst of this litigation, Congress passed the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Act, PUB. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974). The act provides for government cus-
tody of Mr. Nixon's tapes and papers, and requires the Administrator of the General
Services Administration to promulgate regulations to insure the protection of the mate-
rials and to specify procedures for access to them. The act also specifies that the regu-
lations shall be formulated with the objective of transferring to Mr. Nixon those presi-
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less important than clarifying its meaning, since an abridgement of the
right of informational privacy may arise any time personal information
is collected, maintained or disseminated.
1. Improper Collection
Official collection of information which is unrelated, or only tan-
gentially related to a legitimate governmental function, may violate an
individual's privacy rights." 0 Specific examples of improper collection
have been shown by White v. Davis"' (involving alleged indiscriminate
recording by police of college activities) and City of Carmel-By-The-Sea
v. Young' 1 2 (involving overly broad collection of financial information
for conflict of interest purposes). Moreover, although information may
be related to a legitimate governmental function when it is first collect-
ed, after a period of time it may be of no use to the collecting agency.
In such a case retention of the information would logically violate an
individual's right of privacy to the same degree that it would if the
information did not have any legitimate use in the first place. 1
2. Improper Maintenance and Storage
Even if information is relevant to governmental functions, its im-
proper maintenance and storage may be constitutionally offensive if the
dential materials which neither have historical significance nor pertain to the Watergate
incident. When the act became effective Mr. Nixon brought a second suit challenging
its implementation. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1976, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.). Subsequently,
the court of appeals stayed the district court's order implementing Nixon v. Sampson
until a three-judge court could decide whether the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Act was constitutional. Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The three-
judge court issued its decision just prior to the printing of this note. It unanimously
upheld the act, but left open the question of whether Mr. Nixon owned the materials
prior to the effective date of the Act. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1976, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.).
The court held that although Mr. Nixon had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the
act's infringement of such expectation of privacy was reasonable under the circum-
stances, particularly in view of its provision reserving to Mr. Nixon the sole custody and
use of purely personal papers and tapes.
110. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
111. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
112. 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
113. Cf. DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825, 828-
29 (1966) (referring to the "staleness" of information as a consideration for justifying
refusal by an individual to provide a legislative committee with information on his ear-
lier involvement with the Communist Party). Experts consider it to be a desirable in-
formation system practice to either remove from active files (purge) or to destroy dated
information which may be misleading. See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
105-07 (1973) (recommended purging of criminal histories within 5 and 10 year periods
depending upon seriousness of the crime).
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agencies possessing the information do not establish adequate safe-
guards for preserving the confidentiality of the information. 1 4  Profes-
sor Charles Fried has written: "privacy is not just an absence of
information abroad about ourselves; it is a feeling of security in control
over that information." 1 5 In Shelton v. Tucker,"6 the Supreme Court
cited lack of adequate security as a reason for holding unconstitutional a
statute requring teachers to file with the appropriate hiring authority a
list of every organization to which they belonged:
The statute does not provide that the information it requires be
kept confidential. Each school board is left free to deal with the
information as it wishes. The record contains evidence to indicate
that fear of public disclosure is neither theoretical nor ground-
less."17
Among necessary safeguards for preserving confidentiality would
be regulations or legislation restricting access to information and provid-
ing appropriate sanctions against those officials who intentionally or
negligently permit unauthorized access. It is even conceivable that in
certain cases an individual may have a right to insist on certain mini-
mum physical security procedures such as computer programming safe-
guards and restricted points of entry to areas where files are kept."18
3. Improper Dissemination
If rights of informational privacy may be infringed by improper
collection and maintenance of personal information, obviously overly
broad dissemination of such information would also constitute an in-
fringement.'19 Improper dissemination may occur any time informa-
114. See Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 1973); State v. Jacobus, 75
Misc. 2d 840, 846, 348 N.Y.S.2d 907, 913 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
115. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 493 (1968).
116. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
117. Id. at 486 (footnotes omitted).
118. See, e.g., J. MARTm & A. NORMAN, THEm COMPuTERZE SocIm-r 481-88
(1970), for a discussion of possible minimum safeguards.
119. The right to restrict dissemination of personal information may sooner or later
collide with an emerging constitutional right of the public and press to have access to
governmental information. See generally Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press
to Gather Information, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1505 (1974). The right to informational pri-
vacy may also conflict with the statutory rights of access to personal information created
under state or federal freedom of information acts. See, e.g., Rose v. Department of
Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1974) (Air Force Academy officials need not
turn over case summaries of honor code violations to law review researchers without a
prior in camera judicial inspection of the summaries for the purpose of insuring against
a violation of privacy); Wine Hobby, USA, Inc. v. United States Bur. of Alcohol, 363
F. Supp. 231, 237 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (release of names of individuals permitted to produce




tion is transmitted to persons who do not possess a "need-to-know"
related to a legitimate government function.1"' This is particularly true
when information is transmitted for a private rather than a public
purpose. The circulation by the police of an assault victim's nude
photographs by police in York v. Story 1' provides a blatant example.
Improper dissemination may also occur whenever the information is
provided to persons who are likely to misuse the information either
negligently or intentionally. The transmission of psychological records
to untrained school personnel in Merriken v. Cressman'22 illustrates the
problem.
It is likely that courts in the future will be confronted with objec-
tions to the dissemination of personal information from one government
agency to another. In a recent case,'2 3 an individual sought damages
for violation of his right to privacy as a result of a computer comparison
of persons receiving veterans disability benefits with those receiving
social security benefits. The plaintiff who received both types of pay-
ments incurred a drastic but lawful reduction in his disability pension as
a result of the findings of the cross-comparison. The court held that no
violation of the individual's right of privacy occurred, but also observed:
What we have said supra is not intended to minimize the -prob-
lems presented by the interagency -transfer of information within the
federal government. Nor do we suggest that a constitutional
right of privacy might not be found to exist and appropriate relief
granted in instances where the government is possessed of highly
personal and confidential information which has been given under
compulsion of law and with an expectation of privacy and where
the disclosure of such information is unnecessary for the advance-
ment or inconsistent with the fundamental purposes for which the
data was obtained. Rather, we hold only that, on the facts of this
case, Mr. Jaffess has not been deprived of any constitutionally se-
cured privacy right. 124
D. Fundamental Rights and Sensitive Information
In Roe v. Wade'2 5 the United States Supreme Court held that
120. See text accompanying notes 123-24 infra.
121. 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
122. 364F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
123. Jaffess v. Secretary, Dep't of Health, Ed. & Welf., 393 F. Supp. 626 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
124. Id. at 629-30.
125. 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973). In certain informational privacy decisions
where the plaintiff has been successful, a fundamental rights test requiring a compelling
state interest has been employed. City of Carmel-By-The Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259,
268, 466 P.2d 225, 232, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8 (1970); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334,
345, 487 P.2d 211, 217 (1971). See also Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir.
1973); Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 918 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Davidson v. Dill,
180 Colo. 123, 131, 503 P.2d 157, 161 (1972). Other courts have not used the compel-
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privacy was a fundamental right requiring a compelling state interest to
justify intrusion by the government. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting,
declared that the Court's holding amounted to a return to substantive
due process, a legitimation of judicial lawmaking.'2 6  The justice's
concern is understandable. The fundamental rights doctrine is a poten-
tially powerful tool for judicial intervention since it inevitably involves
the conscious weighing of competing factors in a manner similar to that
of a legislative body. It shifts the burden of persuasion from the
individual to the government and requires legislatures to employ the
least drastic means in achieving its objectives. 127  Originally forged in
equal protection cases, 12 8 the doctrine was transplanted in Roe to the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 129  Concern over its
potential scope influenced the Court in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez' to caution against overly broad interpretations:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitu-
tional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "funda-
mental" is not to be found -in comparisons of the relative societal
significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor
is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as
the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether
there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution.' 3'
Whatever the ultimate scope of the fundamental rights doctrine,
Roe v. Wade assures its inevitable invocation whenever privacy interests
are the subject of litigation. The prohibitions contained in the First,
Fourth and Fifth Amendments indicate the high priority placed on
limiting governmental informational gathering in the American political
system." 2 A strong argument, therefore, can be made that the right to
control highly personal information is a fundamental right implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution.
ling state interest test, although they have employed close judicial scrutiny of some kind.
See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 103 Wash. Law Rptr. 377 (D.C. Super. CL 1975).
126. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173-75 (1973).
127. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969). The origins of the
fundamental rights doctrine may be traced to Supreme Court decisions suggesting that
stricter standards of review are appropriate where certain basic rights are involved. For
example, in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960), a case involving associational
privacy, the Supreme Court declared: "In a series of decisions this Court has held that,
even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
be more narrowly achieved."
128. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
129. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
130. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
131. Id. at 33-34.
132. See text accompanying notes 12-47 supra.
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In precisely what situations should courts apply the fundamental
rights test? There is little specific guidance from the Supreme Court on
this question. One answer to this question would be to assume that
privacy of whatever type is a fundamental right. Proceeding on this
broad assumption could create severe practical problems. There are
many areas where the collection and dissemination of information is
useful to officials, but not necessarily justifiable by a compelling state
interest. Should a police officer, for example, be required to demon-
strate a compelling state interest when he asks the name and address of a
person in the course of an investigation of a suspicious incident?'33
A second approach would be to consider as fundamental only those
informational privacy questions arising in areas which the court has
already indicated are within the zone of general constitutional privacy-
",the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood,
procreation, and child rearing."'13 4  The disadvantage to this approach
is that it would likely exclude other types of information deserving an
equally high level of protection, such as certain criminal justice and
medical information.13 5
A third and perhaps the most preferable approach would be to
recognize that Roe dealt with a matter-the decision to have an abor-
tion-which many people would be reluctant to discuss even with their
closest friends, let alone a public official. It may be that informational
privacy rises to a fundamental right only whenever equally personal or
sensitive matters are involved.
136
While it is beyond the scope of this note to detail what information
should be labeled sensitive, it is possible to suggest a general standard.
Sensitive information is that which a person desires to keep private and
which, if disseminated, would tend to cause substantial concern, anxiety
or embarrassment to a reasonable person. 37  Although persons will
133. See Township of East Brunswick v. Malfitano, 108 N.J. Super. 244, 260 A.2d
863 (1970) (holding that the constitutional right of privacy does not justify a tres-
passer's refusal to answer a police inquiry concerning his name and address).
134. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973).
135. See text accompanying notes 48-77 supra.
136. Note, Constitutional Right of Privacy and Investigative Consumer Reports:
Little Brother Is Watching You, 2 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 773, 792-97 (1975) (argument
that the constitutional right of privacy protects against disclosure of "personal" informa-
tion in credit reports).
137. Cf. W. PROssER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 111, 117 (4th ed. 1971). The Supreme
Court, of course, has already recognized the utility in distinguishing certain types of in-
formation from others. For example, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437
(1971), the Court required a hearing where stigmatizing information is publicly dissemi-
nated. For those questioning the propriety of an objective standard, it should be noted
that the Supreme Court has employed similar standards in resolving other constitutional
issues. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
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differ on 'the meaning of sensitive, general classification according to the
degree of sensitivity is not an impossible task. Presumably included
within this standard would be information relating to those intimate
matters already identified by the Supreme Court as coming within the
zone of general constitutional privacy.'13 Also included as sensitive
information would be certain types of medical, psychological and crimi-
nal justice information.13 9 Excluded would be much of what has been
earlier in this note labeled as administrative information, 40 such as the
existence of a driver's license or a passport. Whether financial informa-
tion would be considered sensitive should depend upon how complete
and detailed was the statement of a person's economic affairs.' 4 '
The sensitivity of information would, therefore, determine whether
challenged collection, maintenance or dissemination by public agencies
would receive strict judicial scrutiny. If information is sensitive, the
state should have to show that any infringements of individual rights
concerning the information are necessary to promote a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. If information is nonsensitive, a less restrictive
standard of judicial scrutiny could be employed.
The practical effect of applying a compelling state interest test
would be to shift the burden to the state to demonstrate that the
collection was essential to further an interest which the government is
constitutionally entitled to promote or protect. 4 2 But the burden of the
state should not end there. It would also have the burden of demon-
strating that the information was maintained in such a manner as to
minimize the risk of unauthorized access, 48 and that any dissemination
138. See text accompanying notes 38-44 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 48-71 supra.
140. See note 3 supra.
141. Cf. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78 (1974) (Powell &
Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
142. In First Amendment right of association cases where a compelling state interest
test was employed, various phrases were used to emphasize the high degree of relevancy
of disclosure of the information to a state interest. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legisla-
tive Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 549 (1963) (must be "essential" or have a "cru-
cial relation" to a governmental purpose); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (must be a "controlling justification" for the disclosure).
143. See text accompanying note 114 supra. One authority lists six levels of poten-
tial protection which appear to be applicable to either manual or automated information
systems:
1. Protection against accidental disclosure of secure information.
2. Protection from casual entry by unskilled persons.
3. Protection from casual entry by skilled technicians.
4. Protection against entry by persons who stand to gain financially.
5. Protection against well-equipped criminals.
6. Protection against organizations with massive funds.
J. MARTIN & A. NORMAN, THE COMPUTERIZED SocIETY 481 (1970). Levels 1 through
[Vol. 3
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
was essential to further legitimate governmental functions. A criminal
justice agency may, for example, find the retention of arrest records of
acquitted persons necessary for the compilation of statistics on criminal
careers, but if it disseminates the records to employers, or improperly
maintains the records so that they are easily accessible to unauthorized
persons, the subject's right of privacy may be violated.
In the case of non-sensitive information courts might turn to a
more permissive standard-some type of reasonable relationship test.144
Once a court was satisfied that the state's information-gathering prac-
tices-collection, maintenance, dissemination-were reasonably related
to a legitimate governmental purpose, its inquiry would end. In other
words, collection and dissemination of nonsensitive information which
would directly assist in the furtherance of the public interest would be
permissible. Even under this looser standard, however, minimum meas-
ures would have to be taken by the state to preserve the confidentiality
of the information where public disclosure would not be necessary. The
tendency of courts in applying the reasonable relationship test in other
contexts has been to give only the scantest attention to the question of
state interest. 4 " Hopefully that would not happen in this area. Inquiry
into whether government data processing activities actually further legit-
imate ends is possible without a usurpation of legislative functions. 14 6
Courts, need not, and should not, totally defer to unsupported assertions
by officials concerning the value and integrity of their systems.
II. A Threshold Problem:
The Case or Controversy Requirement
The Supreme Court has construed the case or controversy clause of
Article H, section 2 to require that parties seeking relief in the federal
courts must have sustained an injury or be in immediate danger of
sustaining one. 147  Recent decisions of the Court raise the question of
5 could conceivably be considered as minimal levels of protection for sensitive data re-
quiring fairly sophisticated system safeguards.
144. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); Note, On Privacy, supra
note 44, at 772 n.660.
145. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
146. The argument by Professor Gunther and others for stricter judicial scrutiny in
areas not involving fundamental rights or suspect classifications may be adaptable to the
area of informational privacy. Particularly interesting is Gunther's suggestion that
courts should actively inquire into whether the government's means (in this case its in-
formation systems) substantially further legitimate ends. Gunther, Forward: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1, 20-42 (1972). See generally Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger
Court, 2 HAsT. CONST. L.Q. 645 (1975). The difficulty with his suggestion, however, is
that it may lead to precisely what the critics of substantive due process fear-an unwar-
ranted intrusion into the province of the legislative branch.
147. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 56-57 (1974); Laird v. Tatum,
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when the collection and dissemination of personal information by the
government creates a threat of injury necessary to establish a constitu-
tional case or controversy.148  In partial answer to this question, the
Court has drawn a distinction between situations where the government
compels by summons or subpoena the reporting of certain information,
and where it simply goes out and collects the information on its own. 4 9
Where the government requires self-reporting, the individual apparently
has standing to contest disclosure. 150 It is in those cases where informa-
tion is collected from persons or sources other than the individual to
whom the information relates that difficulties may occur.
In Laird v. Tatum'5 the plaintiffs, political activists, sought a
permanent injunction against the maintenance of an intelligence gather-
ing system by the United States Army. The information was gathered
by army "'surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian political
activity.' 182 It "consisted essentially of. . .information about public
activities that were thought to have at least some potential for civil
disorder. . .. ,153 The principal sources for the information were the
news media and publications of general circulation. The information
gathered typically contained such data as the identity of speakers,
numbers of people in attendance and whether a public disorder oc-
curred. The information was disseminated to various army posts
around the country.
The plaintiffs claimed that the recording of their political activities
by army agents had a chilling effect on their First Amendment rights. A
majority of the United States Supreme Court, unable to see a connection
between the mere existence of the system and the alleged chilling effect,
held that there was no justiciable controversy. According to the majori-
ty opinion, "[a]llegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate
substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of
specific future harm. ... "I
408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972). The requirement of injury is one of several distinct elements
needed to establish standing in the federal courts. Note, Recent Standing Cases and a
Possible Alternative Approach, 27 HASTINGs L.J. 213 (1975).
148. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1 (1972).
149. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55-56 (1974); see also Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
150. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55-56 (1974).
151. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
152. Id. at 2.
153. Id. at 6. Although the majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger discusses no
wider dissemination than within the United States Army, in his dissent Justice Douglas
asserts that the information was disseminated to various federal agencies and local police
departments. Id. at 26-27 (Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
154. Id. at 13-14; accord, Davis v. Ichord, 442 F.2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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Although decided more than a week after the burglary of the
Democratic Party's national headquarters by members of President
Nixon's campaign staff, Laird remains essentially a pre-Watergate deci-
sion. The Court's opinion exhibits an insensitivity to the dangers of
unregulated intelligence gathering which might not have been present
had -the case been'decided one or two years later. As Justice Douglas
stated in his dissent: "[tlo withhold standing to sue until [one's job is
lost] would in practical effect immunize from judicial scrutiny all
surveillance activities, regardless of their misuse and their deterrent
effect." 55
Arguably Laird is still sound authority for the proposition that the
mere compilation and dissemination of data which is publicly available
does not pose a severe enough threat to an individual's First Amend-
ment rights to create a justiciable chill. But the Laird Court was not
faced with a challenge -to the collection of highly personal information.
In such cases the risk of harm to the subject of the information is
appreciably greater.
Laird v. Tatum was followed by California Bankers Association v.
Shultz,' " a case challenging the constitutionality of a federal statute
requiring the reporting and maintenance of financial information. The
plaintiffs included banks, individual bank customers, the California
Bankers Association and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).
Specifically, the statute and its implementing regulations required finan-
cial institutions to maintain records of customer transactions in excess of$100.157 The ACLU challenged this requirement on the ground that
such recordkeeping threatened the First Amendment rights of its mem-
bers by exposing the identities of its members and contributors to
possible identification by the government. The Court was not receptive.
In a six-to-three opinion, it rejected the ACLU claim observing that the
records were not in the hands of the government and that the govern-
ment had made no attempt to compel production of such records. 15
The threat to First Amendment rights, the Court observed, was much
less than that presented by the army's intelligence system in Laird v.
Tatum. 5 The statute and the implementing regulations also required
banks to report directly to the secretary of the treasury any domestic
currency transactions in excess of $10,000.160 In addition, individuals
involved in foreign transactions of over $5,000 were required to report
155. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 26 (1972) (Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
156. 416 U.S. 21 (1974); Note, California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz: An Attack on
the Bank Secrecy Act, 2 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 203 (1975); see also notes 91-94 supra.
157. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 32 (1974).
158. Id. at 55-57.
159. Id. at 56-57.
160. Id. at 39.
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similar information themselves. 161 The Court sidestepped depositor's
challenges to these requirements by noting that they had not shown that
they actually engaged in transactions which would be required to be
reported. 16z Consequently, the Court concluded that the depositors had
not presented a concrete controversy for adjudication. 163 By so hold-
ing, the Court appears to require, as an element of standing, specific
allegations demonstrating that the government possesses, or will possess,
information relating to the plaintiff.
A. The View from the Lower Courts
Admittedly, one possible interpretation of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Laird and California Bankers is that regardless of who is
holding information or what the nature of the information is, its mere
collection is not sufficient to create a justiciable case or controversy.
Support for this exceedingly broad interpretation is found in a
federal court of appeals decision, Finley v. Hampton.' In Finley a
government employee brought an action against members of the Civil
Service Commission and the secretary of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare to have expunged from his personnel file a
statement that "two of his associates had 'homosexual mannerisms.' "165
The employee could not show that he had suffered any pay or grade
impairment as a result of the information, although his job was reclassi-
fied as nonsensitive following the collection of the information. Citing
Laird v. Tatum as authority, the court held that there was no justiciable
controversy because no threat of specific future harm resulted from the
file's existence. The court noted that allegations of a subjective chilling
effect on First Amendment rights of association were not an adequate
substitute for "threat[s] of specific future harm.116  Finley represents
a significant extension of the case or controversy limitation. Unlike
Laird or California Bankers, the information involved was highly
personal containing not only a distinct chilling effect on First Amend-
ment rights of association but also a threat to personal privacy.
The information was not in the hands of a private agency such
as a bank with a profit incentive to keep it confidential, nor in
the hands of a government agency with no legal ability to apply
sanctions or rewards to the subject of the file; instead the information
was contained in the personnel file of the agency employing the plaintiff.
161. Id. at 35.
162. Id. at 68, 76.
163. Id.
164. 473 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
165. Id. at 182.
166. Id. at 185.
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Curiously, the same court ruled to the contrary two years later in
Menard v. Saxbe, 6 7 a case involving arrest records. The plaintiff in
that case had been arrested for burglary and subsequently released by
the Los Angeles Police Department. The record of his arrest and his
fingerprints were forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Menard brought an action to have the arrest record maintained by the
FBI expunged. The court of appeal held that Menard had standing to
sue, stating that although, "Menard cannot point with mathematical
certainty to the exact consequences of his criminal file, we think it clear
that he has alleged a 'cognizable legal injury.' "118
Is there a logical, factual distinction to be made between the
Menard and Finley decisions-between an arrest record and a personnel
record implying that an employee is a homosexual? The answer lies in
the original question articulated in Laird v. Tatum: is there a "claim of
specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm?"'6
The threat of specific future harm would seem to be as great, if not
greater, from the personnel record as from the arrest record. Certainly
it can be argued that the adverse economic and psychological conse-
quences are likely to be similar in nature. Yet the court made no
attempt to reconcile the Menard and Finley decisions.
B. Defining a Cognizable Legal Injury
In discussing what constitutes a cognizable legal injury or harm
courts have emphasized an identifiable loss (either actual or imminent)
of tangible benefits. Courts have found no difficulty in finding a
constitutional case or controversy where a person loses a job or some
other equivalent benefit as the result of the dissemination of personal
information. 170  Similarly, any public disclosure of personal information
injurious to one's reputation is likely to provide the subject of the
information with standing.' 7 ' But there is a practical problem with
limiting the definition of harm to situations where the effect of the
information can be directly traced. Once potentially damaging infor-
mation is in the hands of government officials, it may result in decisions
of which the subject may never have knowledge.' 72 It is impossible for
167. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
168. Id. at 1023; see also Paton v. LaPrade, D.C. Civil No. 1091-73 (3d Cir., Octo-
ber 14, 1975).
169. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972).
170. Id. at 11-12. See also Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 419 U.S.
1314 (Marshall, Cir. J., 1974); Handschu v. Special Services Division, 349 F. Supp. 766
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
171. Philadelphia Yrly. Meet Rel. Society of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335 (3d
Cir. 1975) (disclosure by city officials over national television that plaintiff was the sub-
ject of a police intelligence file is actionable).
172. In one case, a New York Port Authority police detective was observed partici-
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an individual to monitor all of the uses of personal information in the
hands of public officials.
On a given person there may be upwards of 100 files maintained
in various organizations. These range in visibility from those
in which data gathering, use and sharing goes on completely behind
closed doors (e.g., intelligence files) to those in which the individ-
ual has some knowledge about content and use but little, if any,
knowledge about the data sharing which goes on from his file (as
in the case of a bank which routinely shares its account experience
information with credit bureaus) .73
When consideration is given to the secondary and tertiary uses of
personal information systems, the need for a flexibile definition of harm
is easily recognized. The simplest path for the courts to take would be to
declare that there is a threat of immediate harm any time public officials
possess information which an individual has sought to keep reasonably
private. Neither Laird nor California Bankers Assocation would neces-
sarily bar such an approach. Its utility is readily apparent. It would
permit challenges to information before any adverse social or economic
consequences could flow from its use or disclosure. The individual
need 'not identify or trace actual adverse effects resulting from the
dissemination and use of the information. As a practical matter, how-
ever, any extensive broadening of the definition of harm might not be
acceptable to the present Court with its rather narrow view on the
question of standing. 74  Fear of frivolous suits by a conservative judici-
ary would pose a significant obstacle to a more permissive definition.
As a second alternative, therefore, plaintiffs in appropriate situa-
tions might attempt to employ the distinction between sensitive and
nonsensitive information discussed earlier.' 75  The distinguishing char-
acteristic of sensitive information as defined in the note is that its public
dissemination would tend to cause substantial concern, anxiety or em-
barrassment to a reasonable person.' 76 This characteristic alone raises
the threat of harm to a legally cognizable level. The mere fact of
collection of sensitive information may involve an inhibiting effect on
personal creativity and spontaneity, and create personal anxiety. Legal-
ly cognizable harm should be presumed to exist any time sensitive
pating in picketing out of uniform for higher wages. Despite a satisfactory employment
rating, one of his superiors placed a comment in his personnel file indicating that the
detective was an irresponsible commander. When the detective retired a few years later,
he experienced serious difficulty in obtaining employment because his file had been
widely circulated outside the Port Authority. J. RANEs, ArrAcK ON PvivAcY 15 (1974).
173. Baker, Record Privacy as a Marginal Problem: The Limits of Consciousness
and Concern, 4 COLUM. HUMAN RsoHrrs L. REV. 89, 92 (1972).
174. See generally Note, Recent Standing Cases and a Possible Alternative Ap-
proach, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 213 (1975).
175. See text accompanying notes 137-41 supra.
176. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
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information is collected by public officials, unless it has been already
voluntarily disseminated to the public by the person to whom it refers.
The above test would avoid such patently unjust results as found in
Finley v. Hampton.177  Yet it also presents a compromise to those on
the Court who express concern over a highly liberalized standing policy.
I. Conclusion
Several key generalizations have been emphasized in various por-
tions of this note. First, although the overlap is inevitable, the right of
informational privacy is analytically separate from other constitutionally
recognized privacy rights. Second, the potential for infringment upon
an individual's informational right of privacy exists whenever the gov-
ernment collects, maintains or disseminates information. Third, wheth-
er informational privacy is elevated to a fundamental right depends
primarily upon whether the information in question is considered sensi-
tive. Fourth, an individual's standing to enforce his right in federal
courts requires a flexible definition of the harm needed to establish a
justiciable case or controversy.
The informational privacy issues raised in this note are not likely to
be resolved quickly or easily. As the problems of an urbanized Ameri-
ca assume new dimensions, the demands for detailed personal informa-
tion are likely to increase. For the purpose of meeting these de-
mands, the physical, behavioral and biological sciences are developing
new techniques to gather, process, classify and transmit highly sensitive
data. '17 8  It would be reassuring to know as we move to a post-industrial
society that we have not left basic constitutional principles behind.
177. 473 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also text accompanying notes 164-66 su-
pra. An alternative approach may be suits in state courts. Plaintiffs in states having
less restrictive doctrines of standing may be able to circumvent federal standing require-
ments by making their claims in state courts. See White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533
P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
178. See, e.g., Ausubel, Beckwith & Janssen, The Politics of Genetics Engineering:
Who Decides Who's Defective?, 8 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 30, 38 (June 1974) (reporting
proposal by certain public officials that males with specific "criminal" chromosomes be
registered at birth); Wilson, Computerization of Welfare Recipients: Implications for
the Individual and the Right to Privacy, 4 RurERs J. COMPUTERs & L. 163, 165 (1974)
(trend toward computerized welfare data banks on city-wide and regional basis); San
Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, Nov. 9, 1975, § A, at 21, col. 1 (controversy
over mental health screening accompanying free medical test given to poor families).
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